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ROBAK v. UNITED STATES: A PRECEDENT-SETTING
DAMAGE FORMULA FOR WRONGFUL BIRTH
Robak v. United States
503 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. I11. 1980), afd in part; rev'd and
remanded in part, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981).
In recent years some parents of abnormal children have sued the
mother's attending physician for medical malpractice under the negli-
gence theory of wrongful birth.' A cause of action for wrongful birth 2
alleges that the physician failed to diagnose the defects of the fetus or
failed to advise the parents that their child would be deformed, 3
thereby depriving them of their right to make an informed decision
whether to carry the child to term. 4 Many courts have recognized the
1. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D. S.C. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979);
Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modfied, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
2. Wrongful birth as used in this comment should be distinguished from other shorthand
labels to describe negligent conduct. Wrongful life is the child's claim for damages resulting from
being born with birth defects, and wrongful conception or pregnancy is used to describe the action
after the birth of a healthy but unwanted child resulting from negligent sterilizations. The follow-
ing are some of the cases in each of these areas: Wrongful birth-Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 42 1,
404 A.2d 8 (1979) (failure to advise to have genetic testing and subsequent birth of child with
Down's syndrome); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (failure to inform
mother of consequences of rubella leading to severe birth defects); Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d
587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modfied, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978)
(failure to advise genetic testing and subsequent birth of child with Down's syndrome); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W. 2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (misdiagnosis of rubella); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69
Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (misdiagnosis of rubella). Wrongful /f-Elliott v. Brown,
361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (1980) (child born with Tay Sachs disease); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d
689 (1967) (child born with rubella syndrome). Wrongful conception-Kingsbury v. Smith, 442
A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(failed tubal ligation); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (failed vasec-
tomy); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (negligent administering of
contraceptives); Clegg v. Chase, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966, 89 Misc. 2d 510 (1977) (failed tubal ligation).
3. Many suits have arisen for failure to diagnose rubella--Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,
227 A.2d 689 (1967); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975); failure to use amniocentesis to detect genetic birth
defects in utero-Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d
587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modfed, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978);
and failed sterilizations (tubal ligations or vasectomies)-Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303,
59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 I11. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981);
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
4. In such an action the parents claim that with the knowledge that the child will be de-
formed they would have chosen to terminate the pregnancy. Phillips v. United States, 508 F.
Supp. 544 (D. S. C. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400
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liability of the physician under these circumstances 5 and have consid-
ered various items of compensable damage.6 However, until the case
of Robak v. United States,7 no court which considered the question of
liability for a wrongful birth action had faced the challenge of comput-
ing a damage award.8
In Robak, the United States District Court for Nortlaern Illinois
promulgated a damage formula and assessed an exact amount of dam-
ages to compensate these parents with a wrongful birth claim. 9 The
novel development in the Robak case was the decision that the mone-
tary award for future maintenance and support of the child should not
be paid in one lump sum, but rather should be placed in a reversionary
trust with disbursements to be made as expenses are incurred.10 The
N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401,413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d
372 (1975).
5. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D. S.C. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979);
Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v.
St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
6. The courts identified possible categories of expenses to be reimbursed, but the considera-
tion of damages in each case was dicta. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451
F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (cost of medical treatment); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
1975) (the economic costs related to the defect); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233
N.W.2d 372 (1975) (future medical, hospital and supportive expenses).
7. 503 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd in part; rev'd and remanded in part, 658 F.2d 471
(7th Cir. 1981).
8. Prior to Robak no reported case for wrongful birth had calculated damages. All of the
cases reached the courts on procedural motions. The courts focused on the question of whether
liability could ensue and any discussion of damages was dicta. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States,
508 F. Supp. 544 (D. S.C. 1981) (motion to dismiss appealed); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ.
Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (motion for judgment on pleadings); Berman v. Allan, 80
N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (motion to dismiss appealed); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978) (motion to dismiss appealed); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d
846 (Tex. 1975) (summary judgment favoring physician appealed); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp.,
69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (motion to dismiss appealed). In Robak, however, the
court had to set an actual damage award in dollars.
A few courts in actions for wrongful conception (or wrongful pregnancy) had prior to Robak
made damage awards. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (jury
verdict of $19,500 was vacated in a negligent vasectomy case); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d
41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (a jury verdict of $462,500 included $12,500 for loss of consortium and
expenses in a case involving the birth of twins after a negligent sterilization).
9. 503 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
10. Id. Since the purpose of the trust was to pay for the care and maintenance of Jennifer
Robak during her minority and impaired adulthood the purpose of the trust would be accom-
plished upon her death. Therefore, the trust would end at Jennifer's death and whatever property
remained in the trust at that time would be returned to the settlor, the defendant United States.
See G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS, §§ 149-50 (5th ed. 1973).
The district court judge, Marvin Aspen, reasoned that through a reversionary trust the par-
ents could be adequately compensated for their losses yet the defendant could be protected from
an award which might lead to a windfall to the parents. See notes 172-79 infra and accompanying
text.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's finding of the physician's liability for negligence," but
overturned one aspect of the district court's decision on damages.' 2
The Seventh Circuit restored to the damage recovery the amount of
money attributable to raising a normal child which had been sub-
tracted by the district court, concluding that those costs were proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's negligent conduct, and thereby
compensable. '3
Negligence results when an individual does not conform his con-
duct to the minimum standards set by the community. 14 Each person
owes a general duty to his fellow man 15 but special relationships, such
as exist between a doctor and his patient, give rise to a duty of in-
creased care.16 In treating his patient, a doctor must permit his patient
to engage in rational decision-making before consenting to treatment 17
by fully advising his patient as to the risks and consequences of that
treatment.' 8 A negligence action for medical malpractice, therefore,
1i. 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit applied Alabama law under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act [hereinafter referred to as FTCA]. See notes 159-66 infra and accompanying
text.
12. 658 F.2d at 479. Both parties agreed to the reversionary trust as the mechanism for im-
plementing the damage recovery, hence it was not an issue on appeal. The only issue was the
"offset" for the normal costs of childrearing. See notes 196-97 infra and accompanying text.
13. 658 F.2d at 478-79. See notes 192-95 infra and accompanying text.
14. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 28 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter referred
to as PROSSER].
15. The community demands an external objective standard of conduct requiring reasona-
bleness of a man of ordinary sense using ordinary skill and care. However, the "reasonable man"
does take on "non-ordinary" attributes, such as special knowledge. Thus, the reasonableness stan-
dard requires the necessary increased care commensurate with those attributes. The social and
political climate affect what the community might require. Id. at § 32.
16. Historically, the doctor has been a member of a "public" calling who has held "himself
out to the public as one in whom confidence might be reposed, and hence as assuming [sic] an
obligation to give proper service, for the breach of which, by any negligent conduct, he might be
liable." Id. at § 28 (footnote omitted). The standard of care required of the doctor is the degree of
skill and learning commonly possessed by members of the profession in good standing in similar
locales. Id. at § 32.
17. Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) overruled
on other grounds, Bing v. Theinig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957). Judge Cardozo stated that
"[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body." 211 N.Y. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93. For general discussion of this doctrine
see Riga, Informed Consent, 10 LINCOLN L. REV. 159 (1977) [hereinafter Riga, INFORMED CON-
SENT]; Note, Who rAfraid of Informed Consent? An Affirmative Approach to the Medical Malprac-
tice Crisis, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 241 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Who's Afraid of Informed
Consent?]. See also notes 55-61 infra and accompanying text.
18. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Miceikis v. Field, 37
Ill. App. 3d 763, 347 N.E.2d 320 (1976); Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960);
Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), a)'d, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334
(1975).
Many things influence the standard of care. As scientific discovery increases medical knowl-
edge and techniques, the standard of care encompasses this additional knowledge, increasing the
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can be maintained if the doctor deviates from the proper performance
of medical techniques or fails to provide the patient with enough infor-
mation to make a rational choice about treatment.' 9
Against this background, courts have been asked to determine
whether the failure of a doctor to inform his patient of possible birth
defects20 violates the standard of care incumbent upon the doctor as a
professional. If it does, the courts must .further determine to what ex-
tent liability should be imposed upon the doctor for the resulting dam-
ages and how those damages should be paid.
The district court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Robak v. United States2' held that the defendant physician was liable
for negligently failing to inform a patient, who was in the early stages
of her pregnancy, that she had rubella and that the rubella would most
likely cause serious abnormalities in the fetus. 22 Without knowing the
potential for birth defects, the Robaks did not have the opportunity to
consider an abortion. When an abnormal child was subsequently born
they were faced with substantial costs for medical and support services.
The Seventh Circuit determined that the physician's liability extended
to all the past and future expenses necessary for maintaining and sup-
porting the child for the rest of her life.23
This comment will focus on the unique damage formula suggested
by the Robak courts. However, since liability is a necessary predicate
to any damage recovery, this comment will begin with a survey of the
responsibilities of the medical practitioner to his patient. See also Who's Afraid ofInformed Con-
sent?, supra note 17, at 241.
19. Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 455 (1938). Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354
P.2d 670 (1960); Miller v. Kennedy, I I Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), a f'd, 85 Wash. 2d
151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975).
20. There are three major causes of birth defects: Down's syndrome, Tay Sachs disease and
rubella syndrome. Birth defects from Down's syndrome, or mongolism, include mental retarda-
tion, retarded growth, a hypoplastic face with short nose, prominant epicanthic skin folds, pro-
truding lower lip, fissured and thickened tongue, broad hands and feet, and stubby fingers.
Tay Sachs, a genetic disease primarily found in Jewish East Europeans or Jews with that
ancestry, is characterized by failure to grow, hypertoxicity, spastic paralysis, loss of vision, convul-
sions and mental deterioration usually resulting in death at four or five years of age.
Rubella syndrome results in mental retardation, hearing loss, cataracts and heart defects.
The risk of Down's syndrome is increased as the mother approaches 40 years of age, Tay
Sachs occurs mainly among Jewish couples, and rubella syndrome results if the disease is con-
tracted in the early stages of pregnancy. Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actionsfor Wrongful
Life and Wronful Birth, 14 FAM. L.Q. 15 (1980); Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 618 (1979); Kass and Shaw, The Risk ofBirth Defects." Jacobs v. Theimer and
Parents' Right to Know, 2 AM. J. L. & MED. 213 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The Risk of Birth
Defects].
21. 503 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Ill. 1980), afd in part; rev'd and remanded in part, 658 F.2d 471
(7th Cir. 1981).
22. 503 F. Supp. at 982-83, 658 F.2d at 477.
23. 658 F.2d at 479.
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theoretical underpinnings opposing wrongful birth actions and the in-
fluences which persuaded courts to later recognize the cause of action. 24
This comment will then review the process of identifying the various
elements of damage, the theories for compensating victims of these
losses, and the procedures used to calculate the award. Finally, this
comment will analyze the decisions and rationale of both court opin-
ions in Robak, focusing specifically on whether the reversionary trust
resolves any of the problems involved in compensating the losses sus-
tained in wrongful birth actions when the whole question of what
should be considered compensable losses and how they should be cal-
culated is still in doubt. This comment concludes that the reversionary
trust can play a major role in selecting the "loss period" and could
significantly influence the acceptance of emotional distress damages;
however, the remaining calculating procedures would be unaffected
when using a reversionary trust.
Is WRONGFUL BIRTH A COMPENSABLE CLAIM?
THE GLEITMAN v COSGROVE PRECEDENT
Courts have long been hesitant to thrust the judicial system into
deciding if the circumstances of one's birth detract from the value of
life. In Zepeda v. Zepeda 25 an illegitimate son brought an action
against his father for damages sustained from the stigma of illegiti-
macy. The trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Illinois Appel-
late Court determined that judicial prudence would stave off unending
litigation from others dissatisfied with their social, cultural or other in-
herited disadvantages. 26 Three years later, the decision in Williams v.
State27 echoed the theory of Zepeda. This time a New York appellate
court affirmed the dismissal of an infant's suit stating that it was not a
justiciable wrong to be born to a particular set of parents or under a
particular set of circumstances. 28
Some courts have also denied the claims of parents when negligent
sterilization operations have resulted in the birth of healthy children.
24. Many courts will be faced with the question of whether to recognize wrongful birth as a
cause of action. In Robak there was no precedent under Alabama law, the governing law, for
wrongful birth claims. See notes 160-67 infra and accompanying text. The court then must ana-
lyze the precedents from sister jurisdictions. See notes 63-71 infra and accompanying text.
25. 41 11. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
26. Id. at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
27. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 223 N.E.2d 343 (1966).
28. Id. at 483-84, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887, 223 N.E.2d at 344. Conception occurred as a result of
the rape of the mother, an inmate of a New York state mental institution. The court concluded,
however, that being born out of wedlock could not be considered grounds for a suit. Id.
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The birth of a normal child was considered to be a "blessed event" 29
and the benefits and joys of parenthood were thought to far outweigh
any possible detriment. 30 Moreover, to permit recovery for the birth of
a normal child was considered "foreign to the universal public senti-
ment of the people." 3'
Until 1967, the public policy view that life was a blessing both to
the child and his parents precluded any recovery in suits claiming
otherwise. Beginning in that year, however, two distinct patterns
emerged in court decisions--one for negligent sterilizations and subse-
quent births of normal children, another for negligent medical diagno-
sis resulting in births of defective children.
The California Court of Appeal in Custodio v. Bauer32 set a prece-
dent as the first court to clearly recognize that liability could ensue for
faulty sterilizations resulting in the birth of healthy but unwanted chil-
dren.33 The mother of nine children underwent a sterilization opera-
tion to prevent further pregnancies. When she became pregnant
despite the operation, Mrs. Custodio sued her physician for negligently
performing the operation and for breach of contract. The court held
that the doctor could be liable under both tort and contract law after
the parents established a breach of duty.34
Although the birth of healthy children after negligent sterilizations
led to recovery in decisions following Custodio, the prevailing public
view that life was a blessing remained an obstacle to recovery in situa-
tions where the parents wanted children but the children were eventu-
29. Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934). The danger to the wife of
carrying a child to term led to the sterilization of Mr. Christensen. Despite the hazards of child-
birth and a faulty sterilization, a healthy baby was born. The court commented "Jinstead of
losing his wife, the plaintiff has been blessed with the fatherhood of another child." Id. at 126, 255
N.W. at 622.
30. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41, 44 (1957). Mr. Shaheen wanted to limit the size
of his family by undergoing sterilization. When he later failed to prove sterile, a healthy, but
unwanted child was born. The Shaheens sought damages for the expenses of rearing and educat-
ing the unwanted child. The court refused to allow the claim because the plaintiff would experi-
ence the joys, fun and affection of childrearing. Id. at 45-46.
31. Id. at 44.
32. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
33. See, e.g., Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981); Public
Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976);
Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240,
187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
34. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477. Since the action was brought before birth,
the court could not determine for certain if the breach created damage; damage is one requirement
for establishing negligence. If damages were proven later through a supplementary complaint, the
court held that liability would ensue for all damages proximately caused whether or not antici-
pated. In contract theory, the damages are normally limited to those which are naturally expected
to flow from the wrong. Id. at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
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ally born deformed. In a suit against a doctor for negligence, the New
Jersey Supreme Court decision in Gleitman v. Cosgrove,35 adhering to
this public policy, set a precedent for denying recovery for wrongful
birth claims.
In Gleitman, the doctor advised Mrs. Gleitman that the case of
German measles she had while one month pregnant would have no
adverse effect on her child. Relying on this advice she continued the
pregnancy to term but delivered a severely handicapped infant who
was deaf, mute, probably retarded, and nearly blind.36 Mrs. Gleitman
claimed that "but for" the doctor's negligent advice she "might have
obtained other medical advice with a view to the obtaining of an abor-
tion" and thus would not have suffered from either the costs of the care
or the anguish of having a deformed child. 37 The court refused to ac-
cept as a cognizable injury "the denial of the opportunity to take an
embryonic life" 38 and found that public policy was against recovery for
the parents, stating:
Though we sympathize with the unfortunate situation in which
these parents find themselves, we firmly believe the right of their
child to live is greater than and precludes their right not to endure
emotional and financial injury .... [A] claim for them would be pre-
cluded by the countervailing public policy supporting the precious-
ness of human life. 39
Not only did the Gleitman court refuse to permit recovery because
of the public policy considerations favoring life, but the court stated
that the Gleitman's economic injury could not be compensated because
the amount of that injury was "impossible" to determine:4°
A considerable problem is raised by the claim of injury to the
parents. In order to determine their compensatory damages a court
would have to evaluate the denial to them of the intangible, un-
measurable, and complex human benefits of motherhood and father-
hood and weigh these against the alleged emotional and money
injuries .... When the parents say their child should not have been
35. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
36. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 690.
37. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
38. Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
39. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693. Judge Proctor also stated:
It is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold onto it however heavily
burdened ...
The right to life is inalienable in our society. A court cannot say what defects
should prevent an embryo from being allowed life such that denial of the opportunity to
terminate the existence of a defective child in embryo can support a cause for action
.... A child need not be perfect to have a worthwhile life. Id.
This policy was further substantiated by the New Jersey law which made abortions illegal. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (West 1969) (repealed 1979).
40. 49 N.J. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
born, they make it impossible for a court to measure their damages in
being the mother and father of a defective child.4 '
Soon after Gleitman, a New York court in Stewart v. Long Island
College Hospital42 considered a case with a very similar fact pattern
and also denied recovery. Adopting the Gleitman rationale, the appel-
late division, later affirmed by the Court of Appeals, held that both the
child's and the parents' claim must be dismissed, particularly "when
viewed against a backdrop of public policy which at the time declared
the proposed abortion to be an illegal one."'43
Thus, where parents claimed the right to compensation based on
the denial of their right to choose an abortion, courts maintained that
public policy favoring life required a denial of recovery. On the other
hand, where the unexpected birth of a child after a sterilization opera-
tion constituted a basis for the claim to compensation, not the right to
take life, recovery was permitted. The wrongful birth claims failed
while the wrongful conception cases succeeded. 44
Two MAJOR INFLUENCES AFFECTING THE
GLEITMAN V. COSGROVE PRECEDENT
The Decision in Roe v. Wade
The 1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade45 considerably
undermined the policy reasons espoused in Gleitman v. Cosgrove for
denying the wrongful birth cause of action-that the right to life was so
precious that states could not sanction its destruction. 46 After careful
analysis of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme
Court in Roe determined that because a woman's fundamental right to
41. Id. at 29-30, 227 A.2d at 693. The impossibility of determining damages with respect to
the child's claim was determining the difference between life with defects and the "utter void of
nonexistence," an incalculable comparison. But in regard to the parents' damages, three of the
seven justices felt money damages were ascertainable with reasonable precision and favored per-
mitting the question to go to the trier of fact.
42. 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968), modifledon other grounds, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313
N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff'dmem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640, 283 N.E.2d 616 (1972). The
mother was admitted to the hospital with rubella and the doctors refused to perform an abortion;
the result was the birth of a deformed child.
43. 35 A.D.2d at 532, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
44. Cf. Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968), modi-
fled on other grounds, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), afl'dmem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 332
N.Y.S.2d 640, 283 N.E.2d 616 (1972) and Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967)
with Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Il. App. 3d
271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981), Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980), Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) and Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.
App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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privacy implicit in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal lib-
erty included the right to choose an abortion,47 statutes prohibiting
abortions all were unconstitutional.48 The Court recognized, however,
that some state regulations were permissible. At various stages of preg-
nancy, the state's interest in preserving maternal health and in protect-
ing the potential life rose to a compelling interest which could justify
regulation of the woman's right to privacy.49 The Supreme Court es-
tablished a formula for determining permissible state regulation of
abortions. Within the first trimester of pregnancy (approximately the
first twenty-eight weeks), the state had no compelling state interest suf-
ficient to justify interference with the free decision to abort made by the
patient in consultation with her doctor.50 During the second trimester,
however, the state could regulate abortions, acquiring a compelling in-
terest in preserving the health of the mother as mortality rates for wo-
men who abort exceed those for women who carry their pregnancy to
term. 51 It was not until the third trimester, following viability, the
point at which the fetus could survive on its own, that the state could
regulate abortions to protect the fetus. 52 Consequently, after the Roe
decision, states could not declare that at all times the fetus' right to life
superseded the mother's right to choose an abortion.
Informed Consent
Although not the central issue in Roe the Court confirmed the im-
portant counseling relationship which exists between a doctor and his
patient. 53 Within the first trimester, the Court contemplated that the
abortion decision would be made by the patient after consultation with
47. 410 U.S. at 153. The Supreme Court stated:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of
the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of
the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy,
one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious
training, one's attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards
one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's think-
ing and conclusions about abortion. Id. at 116.
48. Id. at 164.




53. The Court stated that prior to the compelling point, "the attending physician, in consulta-
tion with his patient, is free to determine, . . . that, in his medical judgment, the patient's preg-
nancy should be terminated." Id. at 163. The Court expanded on this view of the physician as
counselor in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The physician was expected to
assist his patient in making an informed decision by "giving... information to the patient as to
just what would be done and as to its consequences." Id. at 67 n.8.
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her doctor and consideration of relevant factors, especially the dangers
of medical complications.54
This counseling relationship forms the basis of the expanding con-
cept known as informed consent. Informed consent recognizes the
principle that a patient has a right of self-determination in making de-
cisions concerning medical treatment.5 5 Rational decision-making re-
quires sufficient information to make a deliberate and informed choice.
To ensure this process the medical and legal professions recognize a
physician's fiduciary duty56 to fully disclose the nature of, and risks
associated with, his suggested medical treatment.57 Failure to do so
imposes upon the physician liability for malpractice. 58
Advances in scientific and technological knowledge in the field of
medicine continually expand the boundaries of informed consent and,
thereby, the minimum standard of conduct required of physicians. 59
54. 410 U.S. at 153. See also the companion case Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
55. See notes 17-19 supra.
56. Fure v. Sherman Hosp., 64 Ill. App. 3d 259, 263, 380 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (1978); Miller v.
Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 282, 522 P.2d 852, 860 (1974), afl'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334
(1975).
This fiduciary duty was even recognized by Plato:
The slave doctor prescribes what mere experience suggests--and when he has given his
orders, like a tyrant, he rushes off-But the other doctor, who is a freeman, attends and
practices upon freemen;-he enters into discourse with the patient and with his friends-
and he will not prescribe for him until he has first convinced him; at last, when he has
brought the patient more and more under his persuasive influences and set him on the
road to health, he attempts to effect a cure.
Quoted in Note, Informed Dissent.- A New Corollary to the Informed Consent Doctrine?, 57 CH.
KENT L. REV. 1119, 1121 n.12 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Informed Dissent] PLATO, THE LAWS,
BOOK IV.
57. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
58. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960). Malpractice is a negli-
gence theory based on a doctor's breach of duty. Failure to make reasonable disclosure is negli-
gence as a matter of law. 354 P.2d at 673; See generally Annot. 79 A.L.R. 2d 1028 (1961).
The standard of disclosure includes disclosing those risks which a reasonable man would
have considered material to the decision about a treatment. Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App.
272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aft-d, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975). For a more detailed discus-
sion of informed consent see Riga, Informed Consent, supra note 17. Riga explores whether in-
formed consent requires the disclosure of all material factors (a subjective test) or only those
factors a reasonable medical practitioner in the community (an objective test) would give. The
article states that informed consent recognizes the autonomy and privacy of an individual requir-
ing, therefore, sufficient information to understand the procedures and make a self-determination
to undergo them. See also Informed Dissent, supra note 56, at 1121-25.
59. The standard of care for the professional requires the skill and diligence of a professional
with a minimum of special knowledge-the amount determined by similar locales. PROSSER,
supra note 14, at § 32. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845
(1974); Pegram v. Sisco, 406 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Ark.), af'd, 547 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1976); Ditlow
v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). The minimum standard in a locale must be
established by expert testimony and is not always easy to determine:
[Ilt may be difficult, if not impossible, accurately to state the moment in time when every
physician should know about a new technique (such as prenatal diagnosis), its indica-
tions, and the risks associated with it. When, however, most of a doctor's peers are aware
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Doctors are expected to stay apprised of the latest developments in
their field. Clinical identification of diseases with the potential to cre-
ate problems has led to a heightened awareness of the necessity to de-
tect birth defects in the fetus. At the same time, the ability to detect
defects has improved with the discovery of new techniques for in utero
examinations. 60 Furthermore, because it is common knowledge that
under certain circumstances there is a high risk that pregnant women
will bear children with birth defects, 6 1 doctors are responsible for test-
ing and advising parents about these potential disorders. 62
Hence, the Roe v. Wade pronouncement that the right to an abor-
tion was constitutionally protected, coupled with the informed consent
requirement that doctors inform parents of potential birth defects,
weakened the Gleitman v. Cosgrove precedent. These factors influ-
enced the next court to consider a wrongful birth claim.
JAcoBs v THEIMER: A NEW PRECEDENT
In 1975 the Supreme Court of Texas became the first court to rec-
ognize wrongful birth as a compensable cause of action. In Jacobs v.
Theimer63 the parents of an abnormal child sued a physician claiming
that the physician's failure to inform the mother of the risks attendant
to having rubella during pregnancy deprived the parents of the oppor-
tunity to have an abortion.64 The Jacobs court considered the policy
espoused in Gleitman v. Cosgrove against recovery in that similar
rubella-based injury,65 but stated that the major issue here was Mrs.
of and many use the new technique, the point of therapeutic acceptance has been
reached.
Milunsky and Reilly, The 'Wew" Genetics: Emerging Medicolegal Issues in the Prenatal Diagnosis
oftHereditary Disorders, I AM. J. L. & MED. 71, 76-77 (1975).
60. Several techniques of recent discovery and widespread use are amniocentesis, the use of a
needle inserted in the abdomen to draw fluid from the uterus so examination of cells discarded by
the fetus can be analyzed for birth defects and fetoscopy, the insertion of a tiny lighted instrument
through the abdomen to view any defect in the fetus visible to the eye. Fetoscopy is especially
good to detect hydrocephaly (water on the brain), anencephaly (absence of the brain), spina bifida
(open spine), omphalocoele (open abdomen), and innumerable defects of extremities such as flip-
per-like limbs caused by thalidomide. The Risk of Birth Defects, supra note 20, at 222-23.
61. See note 20 supra.
62. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D. S. C. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See generally, Comment, "Wrongful Birth"'
Should Liability Be Imposed Upon a Physician Who Fails to Warn Parents of the Ricks ofADefects in
Their Unborn Children?, 14 GONz. L. REV. 891 (1979).
63. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
64. Mrs. Jacobs contracted rubella while on vacation. She saw her doctor, was hospitalized,
and was found to be pregnant. She asked if she had contracted measles and if it might have
affected the fetus, but the doctor assured her otherwise. The baby was later born with severe
deformities requiring significant cost for operations and treatment. Id. at 847.
65. The Gleitman court had denied recovery because it could not sanction the destruction of
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Jacobs' right to make an informed decision about her medical care.
The doctor in Jacobs violated his duty of full disclosure66 when he did
not advise Mrs. Jacobs about the potential effects of rubella. Conse-
quently, the court declared that the economic burden resulting from the
physical deformities must be compensated:
It is impossible for us to justify a policy which at once deprives the
parents of information by which they could elect to terminate the
pregnancy likely to produce a child with defective body, a policy
which in effect requires that the deficient embryo be carried to full
gestation until the deficient child is born, and which policy then de-
nies recovery from the tortfeasor of costs of treating and caring for
the defects of the child.67
Since Jacobs, the jurisdictions that have considered the merits of
wrongful birth actions have unanimously recognized the cause of ac-
tion.68 The courts have realized that the judicial system must vigor-
ously enforce the customary standards of good medical practice69 by
finding physicians negligent if their medical care falls below those stan-
dards.70 On the other hand, judicial non-interference would immunize
doctors from liability for their conduct.71
THE RIGHT TO RECOVER: THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Although the right to recover in such actions has received univer-
sal acceptance in recent years, the calculation of the resulting damages
continues to perplex courts. Damages claimed in wrongful birth ac-
tions due to negligent medical treatment generally fall into two catego-
life when public policy favored fife. Further, the court said the abortion that the plaintiffs claimed
they were denied would, in fact, have been unavailable since under New Jersey law abortions
were illegal.
A second Gleitman consideration was that it was impossible to calculate the value of an im-
paired life as compared to no life at all. 49 N.J. 22, 29-30, 227 A.2d 689, 692-93 (1967).
66. 519 S.W.2d at 848.
67. Id. at 849. Although not expressly stating so, the court in effect held that emotional pain
and suffering were not compensable elements of damage, and that economic recovery was limited
to the care and treatment of the particular defects. Id. at 850. See notes 82-110 infra and accom-
panying text.
68. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D. S.C. 1981) (failure to advise and counsel
parents of fetus afflicted with Down's syndrome); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451
F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (failure to perform amniocentesis to detect Down's syndrome);
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (failure to perform amniocentesis to detect
Down's syndrome); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978)
(failure to advise parents of the possible birth defects related to Down's syndrome or use amni-
ocentesis to detect it); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975)
(failure to diagnose rubella to permit abortion). See generally Annot. 83 A.L.R. 3d 15 (1978).
69. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 551 (D. S. C. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas
Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
70. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. at 551.
71. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 433, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979).
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ries: those based on tangible economic injury to the parents, such as
medical, maintenance and support, and education costs; and those
based on the intangible non-economic injury resulting from emotional
distress. Recovery for pecuniary losses has been endorsed by most
courts confronted with the question;72 recovery for emotional distress,
however, remains in disfavor.73
Pecuniary Losses
The Texas Supreme Court in Jacobs v. Theimer recognized the
right to recover damages for the economic injury sustained by the par-
ents through the birth of a deformed child, but it advocated, in dicta,
reimbursing them only for those expenses incurred in caring for and
treating the physical impairment. 74 The Wisconsin Supreme Court fol-
lowed this approach in Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital.75 After con-
cluding that the parents could be compensated for a physician's failure
to diagnose rubella if they could prove that they would have obtained
an abortion, the court also stated, in dicta, that it would limit recovery
to only the damages resulting from the deformity and defects of the
child. These damages included those reasonable additional medical,
hospital and supportive expenses over and above the expenses for rear-
ing a normal, healthy child.76
72. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d
372 (1975). Contra Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (The court refused to permit
recovery for medical expenses).
Several courts not yet faced with proof of damages, reserved judgment on what damages
would be compensable at trial. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D. S.C. 1981); Becker
v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modoied, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
386 N.E.2d 807 (1978).
73. Courts favoring emotional distress damages include Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404
A.2d 8 (1979); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977). Those courts against
awarding emotional distress damages include: Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d
119 (1977), modifed, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978); Howard v. Lecher,
42 N.Y.2d 109, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64 (1977); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
1975).
74. 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975). The Jacobs court had before it an appeal of a motion
for summary judgment. The court reversed and remanded. Id. at 860.
75. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). The Dumer court reversed a successful motion to
dismiss since wrongful birth did state a cause of action. 233 N.W.2d at 380.
76. Id. at 776, 233 N.W.2d at 377. Several other courts cursorily treated the damage ques-
tion. In refusing to grant a judgment on the pleadings for lack of damages, the court in Gildiner v.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) simply stated that medical treat-
ment for the child would be recoverable. The court added, however, that when actually called
upon to decide the merits, additional kinds of damages might be available. Id. at 696. The New
York court in Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978) supported the concept of recovery for pecuniary
expenses for the past and future care and treatment of the child. A determination of the particular
"items of expense or loss," however, had to await a decision on the merits. 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901,
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While many courts accept pecuniary losses as damages which
naturally flow from the wrong, the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Berman v. 4llan77 stands alone in reaching the opposite conclusion.
Although recognizing that the defendant doctor's negligence caused the
additional expenses for medical, educational and supervisory needs,78
the court reasoned that compensation for damages of this nature would
be wholly disproportionate to the culpability of the doctor and would
constitute a windfall to the parents.79 The court refused to place such a
financial burden on the physician for, "[in essence, Mr. and Mrs.
Berman desire to retain all the benefits inhering in the birth of the
child-i.e., the love and joy they will experience as parents-while sad-
dling defendants with the enormous expenses attendant upon her
rearing."8 0
Thus, although no court prior to Robak actually held that specific
injuries were compensable, the courts considering wrongful birth have
generally identified, as compensable pecuniary damages such things as
medical and hospital costs of the pregnancy, future medical expenses
related to the defect, equipment and therapy, and education costs.
However, because more courts have not had the opportunity to con-
sider the possible compensable damages, the outer limits of compensa-
ble pecuniary losses is not yet known.
Emotional Distress Damages
The reluctance of courts to grant damages for emotional distress in
wrongful birth actions seems to mirror the reluctance of courts to ac-
cept a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. At
first, emotional distress was not compensable.8' However, exceptions
slowly were permitted where emotional distress accompanied physical
386 N.E.2d at 813. Lastly, the court in Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D. S.C. 1981)
stated that it was premature to "demarcate the ultimate limits" of damages, but recognized that
some type of damages would be appropriate. Id. at 551.
77. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
78. The doctor failed to use amniocentesis to test for Down's syndrome even though there
was a high risk of the disease in the fetus since Mrs. Berman was 38 years old. The Bermans did
not know of the necessity to have an abortion so they were faced with the costs of treating the
deformed child. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
79. Id. This rationale is inconsistent with a tort system which compensates victims for losses
without really considering the extent of culpability. In other words, a person can blamelessly or
innocently cause injury yet be held accountable if his conduct is contrary to societal expectations.
PROSSER, supra note 14, at § 4.
80. 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
81. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled by Battalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
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"impact," where there was an independent basis of tort liability,82 or
where the fright occurred from being in the "zone of danger. ' 83 Re-
cently, a few courts have even permitted recovery under a "pure negli-
gence" test for merely witnessing the peril or injury of another.s4
Under the "impact rule," emotional distress damages were
awarded as parasitic damages only where there was a contemporaneous
physical injury.85 Recognizing the harshness of the "impact rule,"
many courts adopted the "zone of danger" test. 86 Under the "zone of
danger" test, recovery resulted for emotional distress only if the person
was in close proximity to the potential physical danger, thereby sub-
jected to the peril himself. In addition, some physical manifestation of
the emotional distress had to be proven.87
Recently some courts have permitted recovery for emotional dis-
tress as a bystander if the distress was foreseeable and proximately
caused by the defendant's negligent conduct.8 8 Bystander recovery was
permitted in Dillon v. Legg89 for a mother who witnessed her infant
82. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. McBride, 36 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1930); Gilliam v.
Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974); Davis v. Cleveland Ry., 135 Ohio St. 448, 21 N.E.2d 169
(1939); Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966) overruled by Niederman v. Brodsky,
436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
But the impact rule has been abandoned by many states. See, e.g., Daley v. LaCroix, 384
Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729
(1961); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
83. See, e.g., Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d
237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
84. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968); Leong v.
Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 101 IU. App. 3d
439, 428 N.E.2d 596 (1981); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979).
Prior cases denied the right to recover for emotional distress over the physical injury to an-
other. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp.,
197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
85. Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974); Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d
646 (1966) overruled by Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1977). See Note, An Arbitrary Standard for
Recovery in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 56 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1011, 1012
(1980); Note, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress; Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in California and
other States, 25 HASTINGS L. J. 1248, 1251 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Mental Distress).
87. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961); Niederman v.
Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
The Restatement states that:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bod-
ily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional distur-
bance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable
for such emotional disturbance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1977).
88. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968); Rickey v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 101 Ill. App. 3d 439, 428 N.E.2d 596 (1981); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d
672 (Pa. 1979).
89. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
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daughter being struck and killed by a negligently driven automobile. 90
The California Supreme Court defined the foreseeability of emotional
distress in terms of a three-prong test: "(1) [w]hether [the] plaintiff was
located near the scene of the accident . . . , (2) [wjhether the shock
resulted from a direct emotional impact upon [the] plaintiff from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, . . . [and]
(3) [w]hether [the] plaintiff and the victim were closely related." 91 The
Dillon decision's application was severely limited when several years
after Dillon the California Court of Appeal in Jansen v. Children's Hos-
pital Medical Center92 refused to extend the Dillon decision to a case
where the mother's claim was based on severe emotional distress suf-
fered as a result of witnessing the progressive decline and ultimate
death of her daughter, a victim of a hospital's negligent diagnosis. 93
The court reasoned that the Dillon decision contemplated "a sudden
and brief event causing the child's injury."' 94
The initial hesitancy to extend liability to emotional distress inju-
ries resulted from the fear that fraudulent and exaggerated claims
would result and the courts would be inundated with litigation.95 Later
courts rejected these rationales, accepting the fact that medical science
can distinguish genuine claims from fraudulent ones, 96 and that the
traditional concept of foreseeability of injury, as defined in Dillon,
would adequately and justly limit liability.97
The decisions addressing emotional distress damages in the
wrongful birth context are varied and inconsistent. 98 In deciding
whether to permit emotional distress damages, the determining factor
seemed to be whether the court characterized the mental harm as a
"direct injury" from the doctor's breach of duty to the parents, and thus
part of an independent basis of liability, or as "mental injury" suffered
under the bystander concept. 99
90. Id. at 731, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74, 441 P.2d at 914.
91. Id. at 740-41, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80, 441 P.2d at 920.
92. 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973).
93. Id. at 24-25, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261
A.2d 84 (1970); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
96. See note 95 supra.
97. Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 684 (Pa. 1979).
98. Courts against emotional distress damages include: Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109,
397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64 (1977); Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D. 2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119
(1977), modoied, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E. 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). Courts for emotional
distress damages include: Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Karlsons v. Guerinot,
57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977).
99. When viewed as a direct injury damages were recoverable in several cases: Berman v.
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In Karlsons v. Guerinot 1o the Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
of New York held that the pain, suffering and emotional distress of the
parents of a mongoloid child were a direct injury resulting from the
physician's failure to provide proper medical care. 0 1 Accordingly, the
court determined that recovery could be granted. 0 2 The court rea-
soned that the Karlsons were not bystanders, but instead, were the par-
ties to whom the defendant owed a duty of proper medical care.
Because of the defendant doctor's breach of this duty, they were denied
the choice to abort and forego the mental anguish from the deform-
ity. 0 3 In so holding, the court adopted the reasoning of a prior New
York decision which permitted recovery for emotional distress
damages:
Moreover, not only justice but logic compels the further conclusion
that if claimant was entitled to recover her pecuniary losses she was
also entitled to recover for the emotional harm caused by the sametortious act. 104
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Berman v. Allan t0 5
held that the mental harm suffered by the parents stemmed directly
from the loss of Mrs. Berman's right to abort the fetus. 10 6 This court
also reasoned that if the defendant doctor had properly advised the
Bermans of the procedure called amniocentesis,10 7 the parents could
have avoided their suffering by opting not to have a child afflicted with
Down's syndrome. The court further explained that emotional distress
is just as real as physical pain and no more difficult for a trier of fact to
value.o08 These two cases viewed the emotional distress damages as
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933
(1977). On the other hand, a bystander witnessing the injury of another did not justify recovery in
the following cases: Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64 (1977);
Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modeled, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978).
100. 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977).
101. Mrs. Guerinot sought expert pre and post-natal advise because she was 37, had a thyroid
condition, and had already given birth to a deformed child. The defendants failed to advise her of
the possibility of having another deformed child or that amniocentesis could detect such a deform-
ity. A mongoloid child was born. Id. at 73, 75, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
102. Id. at 78, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 936-37.
103. Id. at -, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
104. Id., quoting Johnson v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643,
334 N.E.2d 590, 593 (1975).
105. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
106. Id. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14. In fact, Judge Handler in a concurring opinion went further
than the majority in advocating recovery for emotional damages. He suggested including recov-
ery for "moral injury." The parents are denied the right to apply their own moral values in the
decision whether or not to permit the birth of a defective child. This moral dilemma can result in
emotional disturbance. Id. at 439-40, 404 A.2d at 15.
107. See note 60 supra.
108. 80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d at 15.
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part of an independent tort.
On the other hand, concluding that the parents were mere by-
standers, the Court of Appeals of New York in Howard v. Lecher'° 9
refused to extend liability for the emotional distress resulting from wit-
nessing the injury of another. 0 Although the court sympathized with
the parents' suffering, it feared a "rippling" effect if damages were
granted, and hence, stated that the law must limit the legal conse-
quences of wrongs. I I Since Howard was decided, several courts have
liberalized the bystander concept in negligent infliction of emotional
distress cases, rejecting the fear of unending litigation as a rationale for
denying recovery. 12 It remains to be seen, however, whether future
courts which characterize the parents in wrongful birth cases as by-
standers will adhere to the Howard approach or follow the lead of neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress cases.
CALCULATING DAMAGES
Within the framework of tort law, damages are meant to be com-
pensatory; 13 the wronged party should be restored to the position he
would have been in had the wrong not been committed. " 4 A monetary
award is substitutionary; it gives a dollar value for a loss which, al-
though was not a money loss, cannot be otherwise compensated." 5
These damage awards may not be based on speculation."t 6 Hence,
once the plaintiff establishes that the defendant's conduct caused the
injury, he must prove with reasonable certainty the amount of damages
109. 42 N.Y.2d 109, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64 (1977).
110. Id. at 112, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365, 366 N.E.2d at 66. The parents claimed that the doctor,
aware of their East European ancestry, should have known of the high risk of Tay Sachs disease, a
degenerative nervous disorder which causes death within four years. The lack of the doctor's
counseling denied the parents the opportunity to test the fetus and, if afflicted, to abort, thus
forcing the parents to bear the mental anguish of giving birth to an afflicted child and watching
her die from the horrid disease. Id. at 111-12, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 364-65, 366 N.E.2d at 66.
111. Id. at 113, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 366, 366 N.E.2d at 65. Although ideally there should be a
remedy for every wrong, New York has recognized that relief need not be provided for every
injury. Id. This may just be a New York phenomenon.
112. Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 101 Ill. App. 3d 439, 428 N.E. 2d 596 (1981); Sinn v.
Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979).
113. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
DOBBS]; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 137 (1935) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].
114. McCoRMICK, supra note 113, at § 137.
115. DOBBS, supra note 113, at § 3.1, 148. The calculation of damages is subject to three dis-
tinct rules: 1) the damage must in fact be caused by the defendant's actionable conduct, 2) the
plaintiff must prove the amount of damages suffered with reasonable certainty, and 3) the dam-
ages shown must not be too remote (i.e. in tort language proximately caused). Id. at § 3.3.
116. DOBBS, supra note 113, at § 3.3, 151.
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suffered. 17 If proof of injury is possible, but an exact amount of dam-
age is not, courts have generally not required mathematical precision in
demonstrating the amount of damages. 1 8 Instead, the requirement of
certainty can be met with enough relevant information for the trier of
fact to reasonably estimate the extent of damage.1 9 Absent this factual
basis, the claim for damages must be denied as too speculative. 120
Courts in wrongful birth cases have had no trouble identifying cer-
tain compensable elements of damage. These include medical expenses
incurred during pregnancy and for childbirth; future medical care; the
costs of equipment, therapy, or educational expenditures necessary to
treat the defects; institutional care; and lost wages.' 2' Although no
speculation exists in proving these expenses, 22 two determinations are
needed in order to calculate damages: the proper "loss period" for
which the costs of maintenance and education should be reimbursed, 123
and what "offsets," if any, should be permitted to reduce the award for
these pecuniary losses. 124
Loss Period
The "loss period" for which recovery is sought represents the pe-
riod in which damage or injury has resulted and will continue to result
as a consequence of the defendant's negligence. The choice of the "loss
period" is very important to the process of computing damages since
the extent of recovery can be greatly increased or diminished by the
selection. Several options are available to the courts. Since a parent's
117. Id. at § 3.3.
118. Id. at § 3.3., 151 n.12 (citing Wilson v. Farmers Chemical Ass'n, 444 S.W.2d 185, 189
(Tenn. App. 1969) ("mere uncertainty as to the amount will not prevent recovery if the evidence is
of such certainty as the nature of the case permits.").
119. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
In such a case, even where the defendant by his own wrong has prevented a more
precise computation, the jury may not render a verdict based on speculation or guess-
work. But the jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on
relevant data, and render its verdict accordingly.
Id. at 264.
120. DOBBs, supra note 113, at § 3.3, 151.
121. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (medical
treatment); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (future medical,
hospital and supportive expenses); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (the costs of
care and treatment of the-defect). All of these kinds of damages are recoverable in personal-injury
cases. MCCORMICK, supra note 113, at § 90, 323.
122. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977).
123. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975).
124. Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (offset for raising a
normal child). Consider also the "special benefits rule" of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 920 (1977) and the "blessed event" philosophy of Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 255
N.W. 620 (1934). See note 29 supra and notes 135-53 infra and accompanying text.
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legal responsibility for supporting a child usually continues until the
child reaches the age of majority, 25 this period has been suggested as
the appropriate "loss period." 126 If the age of majority is selected as the
"loss period" the court will have to look to the appropriate statute to
determine the cut-off age. However, under certain circumstances,
where the child is abnormal and incapable of self-support, ihe parents'
obligations may extend beyond minority and perhaps even throughout
the child's full lifetime. 127
If the damages to be granted are reimbursement for expenses in-
curred for the maintenance and support of the child, the "loss period"
should corollate with the obligation of support. Hence, if the obliga-
tion extends throughout the child's life, the child's life expectancy will
usually be the "loss period."' 28 Actuarial tables prepared by life insur-
ance companies are available to determine the number of years to use
for the computation. 29
These actuarial tables are based on the life expectancy of a normal
individual. 30 It may thus be argued that in cases where deformities
exist which affect the child's life expectancy, some consideration must
be given to determine whether its likely that the deformed child will
actually live a full life.' 3' Where reimbursement is made for a "loss
period" much greater than the actual period the child survives, a wind-
fall might be showered on the parents. 32 This same proposition logi-
cally affects personal injury cases as well, yet in those cases courts
examine only those health factors which would have increased or de-
creased life expectancy before the tort was committed. 33 This ap-
proach follows the logic of traditional damage remedies--that the
125. 59 AM. JUR. 2d, Parent and Child § 50.
126. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977). See also Troppi v.
Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971). See generally Note, Wrongful Birth Dam-
ages- Mandate and Mishandling by Judicial Fiat, 13 VAL. U. L. REV. 127 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Wrongful Birth Damages: Mishandling].
127. Sherlock v. Stilwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 n. 11 (Minn. 1977). See McCarthy v.
McCarthy, 301 Minn. 270, 222 N.W.2d 331 (1974); Wrongful Birth Damages.- Mishandling, supra
note 126, at 150.
128. In wrongful death and personal injury suits, if the injury is permanent, life expectancy is
the assumed "loss period." DOBBS, supra note 113, at § 8.7.
129. Id. at § 8.7, 572. These actuarial tables show the average future life at any given age.
However, DOBBS cautions that these tables are not always accurate. Sometimes the average ex-
pectancy will be lower than the most likely future lifetime. Some care must be used in selecting
the table. Id.
130. Id.
131. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
See notes 178-80 infra and accompanying text.
132. See note 179 infra and accompanying text.
133. DOBBS, supra note 113, at § 8.7.
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injured party should be restored to the position he was in before the
tort occurred; in wrongful birth cases, "but for" the injury a normal life
expectancy would exist. 134 The issue remains open for courts in the
wrongful birth context to use either the full life expectancy of healthy
children or a shortened one based upon the individual health condi-
tions of the child.
Offsets
Offsets contemplate that the injured party, despite suffering legiti-
mate and compensable damage, has also received a benefit. In consid-
ering the allowable damages in wrongful birth actions, some courts and
commentators have claimed that the "special benefit rule" must be ap-
plied.135 This principle of calculating compensatory damages is rooted
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. According to section 920 of the
Restatement, 136 if the wronged party's person or property is harmed,
yet at the same time some benefit accrues to that same interest, the
benefit will mitigate some of the damage. Following the Restatement,
courts subtract from the total damage recovery in tort actions certain
"offsets". Two suggested "offsets" in wrongful birth actions are the
value given to the "benefit" of parenthood 37 and the value attributable
to the ordinary costs of raising a normal child. 138
Benefit Theory
Being a parent has traditionally been considered by many courts
to be a "benefit,"' 3 9 since parents experience love and affection from a
134. See, notes 113-14 supra and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967); Sherlock
v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.
2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Wrongful Birth Damages: Mishandling, supra note 126, at 157-59.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977) states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his
property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that
was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to
the extent that this is equitable.
137. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Troppi v. Scarf, 31
Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn.
1977).
This "benefit" theory derives in part from the "blessed event" philosophy espoused in Chris-
tensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934). Under this theory a child always confers
benefits on his parents. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
It is interesting to note, however, that the courts advocating an "offset" for the "benefits" of
parenthood are in cases involving the birth of normal children. For this comment, those cases are
more properly labeled wrongful conception actions. See note 2 supra.
138. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d
766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
139. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73
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child, pride from a child's achievement, and joy from a child's compan-
ionship; all of these were thought to far outweigh any burdens of
parenthood. t4° Recently, though, the validity of this view of
parenthood as a "net benefit" has come under suspicion. One court
stated that it was "myopic' 41 to consider that the benefits of
parenthood automatically outweigh the burdens. Another judge, in a
concurring opinion, noted that "[e]ven assuming that life is an 'es-
teemed right' and one's life is precious to oneself, it does not follow that
one's existence automatically confers a benefit and no burden on those
having a duty to assure one's life is preserved throughout child-
hood."142 If parenthood is no longer a "net" benefit, the question arises
whether a value attributable to any benefit may still be subtracted from
the damage recovery.
Even accepting the view that parenthood is a "benefit," section 920
of the Restatement clearly provides that a "benefit" may be considered
only in mitigation of injury where the benefit is to the same interest
which was harmed.143 In the wrongful birth context, the characteriza-
tion of the benefits conferred by parenthood as either emotional or eco-
nomic (pecuniary) will determine whether the proposed "offset" is
permissible according to the Restatement. Court decisions support
both theories. If the joys attributable to motherhood and fatherhood
are considered emotional ones, 144 under the "special benefits rule" they
can only be balanced against the emotional pain and suffering from
Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn.
1977); Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D.
& C. 2d 41 (1957); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S.
927 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
140. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co.,
64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
141. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977).
142. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 275, 425 N.E.2d at 971 (Linn, J., concurring).
See generally Robertson, Civil Liability Arising From "Wrongful Birth" Following an Unsuccessful
Sterilization Operation, 19 JURIMETRICS J. 140 (1978).
Following this reasoning, if raising a normal child can be a net burden, then raising a child
who suffers from abnormalities of a dread disease is probably not equatable with the "blessed
event" noted in Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W.2d 620 (1934). See notes 29-31
supra.
Some commentators argue that the parents receive economic benefits from the child where
the child provides services to them in their old age. This argument is inapplicable where abnor-
mal children are not capable of providing support for either themselves or their parents. See
Wrongful Birth Damages: Mishandling, supra note 126, at 159-60.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920, comment b (1977).
144. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 274, 425 N.E.2d 968, 970 (1981), quoting
Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1409 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Kashil: "these rewards are emotional in nature and, great though they may
be, do nothing whatever to benefit the plaintiffs injured financial interests." Id. at 1415.
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raising an unwanted or abnormal child. 45 Hence, the "special benefits
rule" would preclude an "offset" for the benefits conferred by
parenthood where only pecuniary losses are to be compensated.' 46
There are several other courts, however, which have considered the aid,
comfort and companionship that a child gives a parent to be pecuniary
benefits, the value of which is properly "offset" against pecuniary
losses. 147 These benefits may not be present in the case of abnormal
children.
Cost of Childraising
The second frequently advocated "offset" is the cost of raising a
normal child. Applying the "special benefits rule," the court compares
the economic expenses for care, maintenance, education and medical
expenses of rearing a defective child with those same costs for a healthy
child, and awards the excess to the parents as damages.148 The ration-
ale underlying this approach is that the parents desired a normal child
and, while benefitting from parenthood, would have incurred the costs
of raising the child. This theory assumes that after an abortion is ob-
tained the mother will, in a later pregnancy, give birth to a healthy
child, thus incurring expenses for childrearing.149 In effect, the costs of
childrearing for the second child are borrowed for the calculation of
damages regarding the first child, and the compensable damage is only
the added costs from the defect.150
145. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 IUl. App. 3d at 274, 425 N.E.2d at 970, quoting Kashi, supra
note 143 at 1415.
146. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 IUI. App. 3d at 274, 425 N.E.2d at 970.
147. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176, n.12 (Minn. 1977); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Il. App. 3d 271,
276, 425 N.E.2d at 972 (1981) (Linn, J., concurring) (case-by-case determination of whether com-
panionship or financial benefits should be considered in calculating the amount of damages).
148. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d
766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
In wrongful death actions statistical data is available to calculate the cost of raising a child
and is done all the time by estate planners and insurance companies. Moore, WrongfulBirth-The
Problem ofDamage Computation, 48 U.Mo. KAN. Cy. L. Rv. 1, 6 (1979); See also DOBBS, supra
note 113 at § 3.3, 151-52.
149. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 65, 227 A.2d 689, 712 (1967) (Weintraub, J., dis-
senting). This approach is criticized in the dissent:
I would stress that the valuation could not be made by contrasting the defective
child with a normal one, because that was not the option. We cannot go on the hypothe-
sis that the mother would have had the abortion and thereafter conceived and delivered
a healthy child. We are dealing with human beings and not with fungibles, and the
damages are those suffered with respect to this child. The pain of the parents must be
measured against the joy they find in him as he is.
Id. at 65, 227 A.2d at 712.
150. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d
766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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Some commentators suggest that this approach may not be consis-
tent with the traditional goal of compensatory damages-to place the
injured party where he would have been had he not been wronged.' 5 '
Courts have recognized that in wrongful birth cases the wrong was the
failure to inform the parents of possible birth defects, thereby denying
the parents the opportunity to abort the fetus.1 52 In light of this, the
full costs of rearing the child should be recovered because the compari-
son should be between having a defective child and, after aborting,
having no child at all. 5 3 The question remains open as to which ap-
proach is proper for "offsetting" the "benefits" of parenthood and the
costs of childrearing.
ROBAK v UNITED STATES
The district court in Robak, faced with the task of actually calcu-
lating a damage award, confronted both the problem of the proper
"loss period" and any appropriate "offsets." The district court decided
that the normal life expectancy of seventy-one and eight-tenths years 5 4
should be the "loss period," that the damages should be deposited in a
reversionary trust, and that an offset would be proper for the normal
costs of childrearing. 55 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit restored this
"offset." 156
Facts
On September 26, 1977, Anna and Robert Robak filed a medical
malpractice suit against the United States for negligent medical care
received in a military hospital in Fort Rucker, Alabama in 1972. Mrs.
Robak had visited the hospital clinic with a fever and a rash. When a
pregnancy test confirmed that she was one month pregnant, the doctor
properly tested Mrs. Robak for German measles, medically known as
"rubella," because rubella can cause major birth defects if contracted in
the early stages of pregnancy. 57 Mrs. Robak was tested twice--the
151. MCCORMICK, supra note 113.
152. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D. S.C. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979);
Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807, (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v.
St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
153. Kelley, Wrongfu Life, Wrongful Birth, and Justice in Tort Law, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 919,
952-54 [hereinafter cited as Justice in Tort Law].
154. 503 F. Supp. at 983. The 71.8 years life expectancy came from insurance tables.
155. Id. at 983 n.2.
156. 658 F.2d at 479.
157. See Note, New Jersey Recognizes Emotional Distress Damages in Wrongful Birth Action
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first blood test was negative; the second, several days later, was posi-
tive. Neither the doctor nor the clinic staff informed Mrs. Robak that
she had rubella or advised her of the serious consequences the disease
could have on an unborn fetus.
Jennifer Robak was born January 12, 1973 afflicted with hearing
loss, bilateral cataracts, a slight heart defect, and suspected mental re-
tardation. Four years later, after several operations and occupational
and physical therapy, 58 the Robaks learned that Jennifer's defects
were common symptoms of rubella-syndrome. The Robaks filed suit
against the defendant doctor contending that had they known their
baby would be born with these maladies they would have aborted the
pregnancy.
The Robaks' complaint alleged substantial injury to both parents,
each seeking recovery in a separate count for the care, education and
maintenance of Jennifer. Another count was a cause of action on be-
half of Jennifer herself. 59 The district court dismissed Jennifer's
"wrongful life" suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted, but denied the government's motion to dismiss the parents'
"wrongful birth" actions.
As residents of Illinois, the Robaks sued the United States in the
Northern District of Illinois under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 160 The
case arose under the FTCA because Mrs. Robak was treated in a mili-
tary hospital by an employee of the federal government. Under the
FTCA, the United States government is liable for the negligent and
tortious acts of its employees acting within the scope of their employ-
ment' 61 if a private person would be liable for the same negligent
Involving a Deformed Child-Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979), 55 WASH. L. REV.
701, 703 n.23 (1980).
158. Jennifer Robak required two operations for bilateral cataracts, occupational and physical
therapy, and special training and education for the deaf and blind. Robak v. United States, 658
F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1981).
159. There were two wrongful birth counts, one for each parent and a wrongful life count on
behalf of Jennifer. Id. at 473.
160. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976).
161. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) & 2671 (1976). Section 1346(b) states:
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages .... for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
Section 2671 Definitions:
As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title the term ...
"[employee of the government" includes officers or employees of any federal agency,
members of the military or naval forces of the United States, and persons acting on
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conduct. 162
Although federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over suits
brought under the FTCA, 163 the substantive law is that of the state law
of the place where the negligent act or omission occurred. 164 Since
there was no existing precedent under Alabama law for wrongful birth,
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois looked to the
state of Alabama for guidance. 165 The Alabama Supreme Court unani-
mously declined to answer.' 66 The district court then asked the Court
of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit to determine Alabama law, but the
Seventh Circuit refused. 167 The case returned to the district court for a
trial which took place on October 7, 1980.
The District Court Determination
At the end of a four-day bench trial, Judge Aspen issued an oral
statement of liability, but reserved judgment on the amount of damages
and calculation of attorney's fees.' 68 Based on the evidence presented,
behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the
service of the United States, whether with or without compensation.
"Acting within the scope of his office or employment", in the case of a member of
the military or naval forces of the United States, means acting in line of duty.
See generally Note, Strict Liability Within the Federal Tort Claims Act. Does it Belong?, 57 CHI-
KENT L. REv. 499 (1981) for a discussion of the historical justification for enactment of the FTCA
and the desired effects. Id. at 499-501 and 500 n.13.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976) states: "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provi-
sions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for
punitive damages."
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
164. Id.
165. The district court certified the following question to the Alabama Supreme Court for a
decision according to Alabama law: "Can the parents of a rubella syndrome child maintain a
cause of action for past and future maintenance and care of that child under Alabama law when
the parents could have chosen to terminate the pregnancy if the defendant had not failed to diag-
nose the mother's rubella?" Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d at 473 n.2.
166. Id. at 473.
167. Id. The district court certified the question to the Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b)
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may there-
upon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is
made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That applica-
tion for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
168. 503 F. Supp. at 983. This comment will not further consider the award of attorney's fees
since in a typical wrongful birth action it would not be at issue. Here the question arose since the
FTCA regulates the award of attorney's fees. 658 F.2d at 479-80. The discarded district court's
plan provided for an initial award of $100,000 and then one-third of the actual disbursements
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the court, in its memorandum opinion of November 13, 1980, awarded
the Robaks $900,000 total damages for the care of Jennifer, a judgment
of $450,000 to each parent.' 69 This $900,000 was only a partial reim-
bursement for the costs of Jennifer's maintenance through minority
and her impaired adulthood that were proved at trial: $30,000 for past
expenses; $229,800 for the cost of residential education and care
through minority (age 21), discounted to present value; 70 $515,000 for
the cost of either a companion skilled in sign language and the care of
emotionally disturbed persons, or institutional care for the remainder
of her adult life; and $200,000 for the support of Jennifer through her
made from the trust as the funds were withdrawn to be awarded as attorney fees. 503 F. Supp. at
985.
The Seventh Circuit made a statutory interpretation that under a 1966 amendment to the
FTCA, in 1966 the district court could not exercise any discretion in the fee arrangement between
the attorney and his client as long as the agreement was within the statutory limits of twenty-five
percent.
28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1981). The original section 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1965) read in part as follows:
The Court rendering a judgment for the plaintiff pursuant to section 1346(b) of this
title,. . . may, as part of such judgments,. . . determine and allow reasonable attorney
fees, which, if the recovery is $500 or more, shall not exceed. . . 20 per centum of the
amount recovered under section 1346(b) of this title, to be paid out of but not in addition
to the amount of judgment, . . . recovered, to the attorneys representing the claimant.
Section 2678 after the 1966 amendment now reads: "No attorney shall charge, demand, receive,
or collect for services rendered, fees in excess of 25 per centum of any judgment rendered pursuant
to section 1346(b) of this title .... " 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1981).
The Senate Report on the amendment had stated the legislative intent:
The language of the committee amendment merely places a limit on fees and removes
from the section the requirement of agency or court allowance of the amount of attorney
fees. The actual amount of attorney fees within the statutory limits, therefore, is made a
matter for determination between the litigant and his attorney.
S.Rep.No. 1327 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. Code Cong. &Ad News 2515, 2521.
In addition, the court noted that:
[Tihe formula developed by the district court would have a significant chilling effect on
counsel bringing such action, for their fee would be contingent on future events that
might have nothing to do with the merits of the case or the competence of their represen-
tation of their client. If Jennifer Robak were to die accidentally of causes completely
unrelated to her rubella syndrome, for example, counsel here would receive a very small
fee for very extensive efforts.
658 F.2d at 480 n.28.
169. The parents filed separate claims stating that each had an individual responsibility for the
maintenance and support of Jennifer. They received separate awards. The maximum total
award, however, could not exceed the $1,000,000 claimed. Robak v. United States, 503 F. Supp.
982, 983 n. I (N.D. Ill. 1980); See 59 AM. JUR. 2d, Parent and Child, § 50, 137 (1971).
170. L. FRUMER, 3 PERSONAL INJURY-ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 3.04 at 206-07
(1965). Since a damage award contemplates payment in cash now as compensation for past and
future expenses, but is to be compensation for actual loss and no more, it is necessary to reduce the
award to present value. Otherwise, the award would pay now for money due later, and if invested
would overcompensate the plaintiff. Reducing to present value requires determining what
amount when safely invested and earning a given rate of interest would provide the total award at
the end of the time (e.g. 71.8 years in the Robak's case). Id. See DOBBS, note 113 supra, at § 8.7.
The rate of interest may vary. Some courts have picked a fixed rate, others leave it to the
"common sense" of the jury, but in most cases the figure is below the "legal" interest rate (the
statutory maximum or the judgment interest rate). DOBBS, note 113 supra, at §§ 3.5, 8.7.
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adult life since she would never be self-supporting. 171 The court sub-
tracted, as an "offset," an amount attributable to the cost of raising and
supporting a normal child.' 72
The district court further suggested the establishment of a rever-
sionary trust as the mechanism for payment of the award.173 Both par-
ties agreed that the money would be placed in a trust and sums from
the corpus would be disbursed as needed to pay for the costs of Jen-
nifer's care and support. 174 Upon Jennifer's death, the remainder of
the award, if any, would be returned to the defendant. 75
The payment of Jennifer's support expenses through a reversion-
ary trust addressed two apprehensions of the court: that Jennifer
would always be supported and that the Robaks would be fully com-
pensated for their added expenses without receiving a windfall upon
Jennifer's death. 176
The reversionary trust also permitted the court to use the actuarial
life expectancy tables of healthy individuals without assessing what
downward adjustment to make for Jennifer's irreversible medical con-
dition. 177 Hence, under the reversionary trust, if Jennifer lived the full
seventy-one and eight-tenths years 78 her entire expenses would be cov-
ered. If she lived a shorter life, the reversionary trust would return the
remainder of the damage award to the government, preventing her par-
ents from being compensated for expenses they never incurred. 179
Through the vehicle of a reversionary trust, neither party would be pe-
nalized for an error of judgment concerning the expected length of Jen-
nifer's life.
The district court decision was appealed on several grounds. The
Government appealed the district court's determination that liability
could exist under Alabama law as it existed in 1972.180 The plaintiffs
171. 658 F.2d at 478.
172. 503 F. Supp. at 983 n.2. The district court explained that the damage award compensated
the Robaks for their past and future expenses: "The costs of maintaining their daughter, over and
above the costs of raising and supporting a normal child." Id. The court subtracted approxi-
mately $75,000 for child-rearing costs. This appears to be an arbitrary figure since the only evi-
dence at trial regarding such costs was a newspaper article bearing the headline, "It costs $85,000
to raise a child." 658 F.2d at 478 n.21. See notes 195 infra and accompanying text.
173. 503 F. Supp. at 983.
174. Id.
175. Id. See note 10 supra.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 983. The court would otherwise have been reluctant to award such a large figure.
Id. at 984 nn. 3 & 4.
178. See note 154 supra.
179. 503 F. Supp. at 983.
180. 658 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1981).
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cross-appealed alleging that the court was not justified in reducing the
amount of damages by an amount equivalent to raising a normal
child. 18 1
The Seventh Circuit Decision
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first
considered whether, under Alabama law, a doctor could be held liable
for damages to the parents for a child born with defects-a birth which
would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's omission to inform
the pregnant mother that she had rubella. The court answered in the
affirmative, holding that neither an Alabama law prohibiting abortions
nor a prior wrongful life suit were dispositive of Alabama law for
wrongful birth.182 The court reasoned that after Roe v. Wade a state
could not constitutionally enforce a law prohibiting abortions, and that
although the Supreme Court of Alabama rejected a wrongful life claim
in Elliott v. Brown, 8 3 wrongful life suits are based on different policy
considerations. In wrongful life suits the child asks the court to decide
that it would be better not to have been born at all than to be born
deformed, whereas in a wrongful birth claim the cause of action aims
to compensate the parents for the denial of their right to choose an
abortion. 84 Looking to the precedents of two rubella-syndrome cases
in sister jurisdictions, Jacobs v. Theimer,18 5 and Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hospital,18 6 the Seventh Circuit held that Alabama law permitted
wrongful birth actions. 8 7
In establishing that Alabama law would permit liability, the Sev-
enth Circuit joins all of the state and federal jurisdictions considering
wrongful birth since Roe in rejecting the archaic anti-abortion policy
considerations of Gleitman v. Cosgrove. In fact, the Seventh Circuit
found comfort in the fact that the New Jersey Supreme Court had itself
rejected that very notion in when Berman v. Allan, it declared that
"[plublic policy now supports rather than militates against, the proposi-
tion that [the mother] not be impermissibly denied a meaningful oppor-
tunity to make [the] decision" to have an abortion. 88
The Seventh Circuit noted that wrongful birth was "little different
181. Id. at 474.
182. Id. at 476.
183. 361 So.2d 546 (Ala. 1978).
184. 658 F.2d at 475.
185. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
186. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
187. 658 F.2d at 476.
188. Id. at 474, quoting Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, -, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979).
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from an ordinary medical malpractice action."' 89 According to the
court, the doctor's conduct in the case at bar failed to meet the required
standard of care of a professional in Alabama; 90 the Robaks' injury
was proximately caused by the doctor's omission. 19 1
The second major issue before the court was the question of dam-
age calculation. The Seventh Circuit rejected the district court's deter-
mination that the cost of raising and supporting a normal child should
reduce the compensatory award for past and future maintenance and
support,192 holding that Alabama courts follow the general rule in med-
189. Id. at 476. The Seventh Circuit quotes Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807, 811, 813 (1978):
[ilrrespective of the label coined, plaintiffs' complaints sound essentially in negli-
gence or medical malpractice ....
Plaintiffs state causes of action in their own right predicated upon a breach of a duty
flowing from defendants to themselves, as prospective parents, resulting in damage to
plaintiffs for which compensation may be readily fixed.
658 F.2d at 476, n.10.
190. Id. at 477-78. The proper standard is the degree of care, skill and diligence commonly
exercised by members of his profession in similar locales. Id. See PROSSER, note 14 supra, at
§ 32.
The "similar locale" rule in Alabama was the "general neighborhood" rule. ALA. CODE § 6-
5-484(a) (1975):
In performing professional services for a patient, a physician's, surgeon's or dentist's
duty to the patient shall be to exercise such reasonable care, diligence and skill as physi-
cians, surgeons, and dentists in the same general neighborhood, and in the same general
line of practice, ordinarily have and exercise in a like case.
The Alabama Supreme Court had interpreted this statute to mean a "national medical neighbor-
hood" standard and since the expert who testified for the Robaks practiced in a similar military
hospital during the time Mrs. Robak was treated, his testimony proved that Mrs. Robak's doctor,
and therefore, the United States, was negligent. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 477-78.
See, e.g., Baker v. Chastain, 389 So. 2d 932 (Ala. 1980); Zills v. Brown, 382 So. 2d 528 (Ala. 1980).
191. 658 F.2d at 476-77. Following Alabama law the Seventh Circuit utilized the "but for"
test to determine if the injuries were caused by the defendant. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala.
327, 280 So.2d 758, 761 (1973).
The court rejected the government's argument that the irreversible injury to the fetus from
the rubella actually occurred prior to the defendant's negligent conduct, and, therefore, could not
have caused the injury. The Seventh Circuit recognized that a negligent act did not have to be the
sole cause of the injury. Prosser states "[t]he event without millions of causes is simply inconceiv-
able." PROSSER, note 14 supra, at § 14, 239. Even so, the Seventh Circuit also recognized that
wrongful birth claims are for the denial of the right to seek an abortion to avoid the added ex-
penses from the injury to the fetus, rather than for injuring the fetus. Id.
Once the causal link is established the defendant's liability for the consequences may be
limited by the policy concerns of proximate cause. The concept of foreseeability of harm must be
considered. Two general theories exist. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
(1928) demanded that foresecability only extend to those within the "zone of danger." The oppo-
site view is espoused in In re Arbitration Polemis v. Furness, 3 K.B. 560 (1921) which permitted
recovery for unlimited liability as long as a direct sequence could be proved from the act to the
injury. American courts follow the Palsgraf view.
Other limitations weighing on a court's decision on proximate cause are the events and com-
munity values existing at the time of the act. PROSSER, supra note 14 at §§ 42-43. The Seventh
Circuit refused to hold Alabama's public policy against abortion to be a limiting force under
proximate cause. 658 F.2d at 476-77.
192. Id. at 479. See note 172 supra and accompanying text.
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ical malpractice suits that the negligent tortfeasor is liable for all dam-
ages proximately caused by his conduct. 93 "But for" the defendant's
negligence which deprived the Robaks of the opportunity to abort, the
Robaks would not have had to bear any costs in raising a child. There-
fore, the court stated, all expenses including the cost of raising a normal
child were compensable. 94 The court then remanded the case for a
proper determination of damages in light of its decision. 195
ANALYSIS
Although the Robak case follows precedents of other jurisdictions
in permitting wrongful birth actions, 96 it marks the first time that any
court has formulated a damage award for wrongful birth. 197 The dis-
trict court confronted some of the perplexing issues in damage calcula-
193. Id. See Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933).
194. 658 F.2d at 479.
195. Id. On remand, the district court denied subtracting any amount for the costs of raising a
normal child and refused to add any additional damages to the award. The court stated:
Regarding the computation of damages, with all due respect, it is our view that the
court of appeals apparently either misread our November 13, 1980 opinion or was misled
with respect to the Court's method of computing the damages stated therein. Contrary to
the suggestion in the court of appeals' opinion, the Court did not reduce the damages
awarded to plaintiffs by an amount it considered to be the cost of raising a normal,
healthy child. As the court of appeals correctly noted, the only evidence submitted at
trial concerning the cost of raising a healthy child was a newspaper article stating that it
cost $85,000.00 to raise a child. As Judge Swygert stated his opinion for the court, "[a]
reduction of a damage award based on such unsupported evidence would be improper."
Accordingly, because the Court found that there was insufficient evidence in the record
to determine the cost of raising a normal child; [insufficient whether the amount was to
be added or subtracted from the already provided damage award] the cost of raising a
normal child did not enter into our damage determination at all, either positively or
negatively. Indeed, that was the import of the footnote in our November 13th opinion
stating that the damages awarded were "over and above the costs of raising and support-
ing a normal child. . . .The Court's determination of the amount of damages to which
plaintiffs are entitled was based on its computation of the amount plaintiffs had ex-
pended and would expend in the future to care for Jennifer without regard to the cost of
raising and supporting a normal, healthy child." (citations omitted).
Robak, No. 77C 3595, slip op. on remand at 2-3.
Despite the district court's explanation of its action and its characterization of the "true"
meaning of footnote two of its memorandum order of November 13, 1980, this author is uncon-
vinced that footnote two can mean anything other than a recognition that some offset was made
regarding the expenses of normal childrearing. If the $90,000 had been recompense for all past
and future expenses resulting from the defendant's tort, then the qualification of expenses in-
cluded and mentioned in footnote two was superfluous, and, incongruous with what the district
court now claims it did in calculating the damage award.
196. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D. S.C. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979);
Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D. 2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modoed, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.
2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975); PROSSER, note 14 supra, at § 32.
197. It is important to note here that this comment distinguishes the wrongful birth claim from
that of wrongful conception. See notes 2 and 8 supra.
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tion such as "loss period" and "offsets,"'' 98 and, with a modification by
the Seventh Circuit,199 advanced a meaningful approach to damage
calculation. The Robak formula does not resolve every aspect of
proper calculating procedures, but certainly provides an excellent
groundwork upon which to build.
The district court suggested a novel mechanism for compensating
victims of negligent conduct-a reversionary trust.200 The reversionary
trust presented the court with a means to resolve the question of the
appropriate "loss period" for ascertaining damages. Justifiably, the
court rejected the age of majority as the outer limit for reimbursing the
Robaks' expenses, recognizing as it did that because of Jennifer's im-
paired health the parents' obligation to support would extend beyond
majority. 20' However, it nevertheless remained necessary to select an
appropriate "loss period." The choice lay between the life expectancy
as determined by the actuarial tables for a healthy child or some short-
ened lifespan which would adequately account for Jennifer's medical
condition. The trust concept permitted the court to base the "loss pe-
riod" on the actuarial tables for a healthy child while accommodating
the concern that Jennifer would not live for that entire period of time.
Tort cases support the utilization of the life expectancy of normal chil-
dren for such damage calculation. In a recent wrongful life claim in
California, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories20 2 a California court
confronted the issue of determining the proper "loss period." The com-
plaint sought damages based on the actuarial life expectancy of seventy
years. The court rejected the seventy year limit, but did so only be-
cause children afflicted with Tay Sachs can not survive longer than four
or five years. 203 While under these circumstances using the seventy
year life expectancy would be unreasonable, that would not be the case
with Jennifer Robak. Jennifer might live the full seventy-one and
eight-tenths years. Besides, in analogous negligence actions, the "loss
period" used for cases involving permanent injury is usually the life
198. See notes 125-53 supra and accompanying text.
199. See notes 192-95 supra.
200. 503 F. Supp. 982, 983 (N.D. IU. 1980). See note 10 supra.
201. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 n.ll (Minn. 1977); 59 AM. JUR. 2d,
Pareni and Child § 50 (1971). See text accompanying notes 125-27 supra.
202. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). The Curlenders were tested by Bio-
Science Laboratories to determine if they were carriers of Tay Sachs disease, a degenerative ner-
vous disorder resulting in death within the first five years of life. The results showed they were not
carriers but that information was inaccurate. The Curlenders gave birth to a child afflicted with
Tay Sachs. The court held that the child had a cause of action for wrongful life.
203. Id. at 822, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489. See note 20 supra.
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expectancy of a normal individual.2°4
The district court in Robak, however, hesitated to follow the lead
of wrongful death and personal injury cases without the reversionary
trust as a vehicle, perceiving itself ill-equipped to accurately predict the
life expectancy of someone with Jennifer's irreversible medical condi-
tion.205 The district court feared that an error in calculation could lead
to substantial inequities. The parents might be unjustly enriched if
they were reimbursed for expenses never incurred should Jennifer die
before the seventy-one and eight-tenths years expired, thereby penaliz-
ing the defendant unfairly.206 On the other hand, utilizing a life ex-
pectancy figure less than one provided in actuarial tables might under
compensate the Robaks should Jennifer live the same life span as a
healthy child.
According to the record the defendant failed to present evidence to
support its claim that Jennifer's irreversible condition would lessen her
life expectancy. 20 7 However, the court noted the improbability of her
living the full seventy-one and eight-tenths years predicted in the insur-
ance tables.20 8 This lack of evidence may have produced the district
court's reluctance to make an award based on the seventy-one and
eight-tenths years while at the same time thwarting the court's ability to
choose a shorter "loss period", or, the court simply may not have
wanted to predict Jennifer's lifespan. The reversionary trust, by its
very nature, resolved any problem the court might have had in deter-
mining the appropriate "loss period."
With the reversionary trust as a vehicle for implementing payment
of damages, the district court could, without trepidation, direct the re-
imbursement for all expenses incurred for the care and maintenance of
Jennifer for the full seventy-one and eight-tenths years. 20 9 The amount
of money calculated as sufficient to pay all of the proven past and fu-
ture expenses, discounted to present value,210 would be deposited in a
204. See DOBBS, supra note 113, at § 8.7.
205. 503 F. Supp. at 983.
206. Id.
207. The government argued that it was highly improbable that Jennifer Robak would live
71.8 years because of impaired health. However, they did not offer any evidence to support this
contention. The plaintiffs reply brief, on the other hand, indicated that at trial the child's medical
condition proved not to be life threatening and that she would enjoy a normal life expectancy.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 at 13 (TR 141-42, 165).
208. 503 F. Supp. at 983.
209. Id.
210. Damage awards pay now for further expenses. In order not to overcompensate the plain-
tiff, some discount must be effected. See note 170 for an explanation of the process of discounting;
DOBBS, supra note 113.
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trust. Upon Jennifer's death, any excess in unused trust proceeds
would return to the defendant. 211
In effect, this procedure provides the best possible protection for
the interests of both parties. The parents will be adequately and equi-
tably reimbursed for all expenses for whatever number of years Jen-
nifer lives up to seventy-one and eight-tenths years. On the other hand,
should Jennifer die before this period ends, the defendant receives the
remaining trust funds, thereby protecting the defendant from paying
more than a reimbursement for the precise loss sustained by the par-
ents. Although in the Robak case the defendant was the United States
government, which could spread the burden of its judgment among all
taxpayers, in most cases the defendant would be an individual doctor.
For the latter kind of defendant, who would be forced to bear the bur-
den virtually alone, the reversionary trust as a mechanism for imple-
mentation of damages would be even more appealing as a protection
against excessive awards.
Because an award to the parents made through a reversionary trust
carries with it certain "strings," the trust can also protect the abnormal
child. This concept of protecting the injured minor is not new to the
damage arena. In some personal injury cases courts have suggested not
reimbursing parents for any medical costs for treating the minor in the
future, even though the parents' obligation of support to the minor ex-
tends through majority, and perhaps beyond. In instances where the
parents' damage was based on the pecuniary expense of treating the
personal injury of their minor, the suggested approach is not to include
the future expenses of this medical treatment in the parents' award.
The courts suggest, instead, that the child recover these expenses him-
self because a parent may recover the full amount for care but not
devote those funds to the care of the child.212
At first glance this concept of reimbursing the minor for future
medical costs incurred as a result of his injuries might be applicable to
the wrongful birth context. In reality, however, because wrongful life
claims, have been almost universally denied,213 if the parents don't
themselves recover for the expenses incurred, no one will. Until courts
accept the wrongful life claim as a valid cause of action, thus providing
for the injured child to recover for damage to his own interest, the re-
211. 503 F. Supp. at 983.
212. See MCCORMICK, supra note 113, at 329 n.9 citing Clarke v. Eighth Ave. R.R., 238 N.Y.
246, 144 N.E. 516 (1924); Rockwood v. Lansburgh, 109 Cal. App. 581, 293 P. 792 (1930).
213. The first court to permit a wrongful life cause of action was the California Court of
Appeal in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
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versionary trust is the best means to resolve both the problem of ensur-
ing that the child will be adequately cared for while at the same time
ensuring reimbursement to the parents.214 Protecting the child in this
manner was a major concern of the district court. Under the trust ar-
rangement, sums will be withdrawn only to pay maintenance costs as
incurred, and the trust proceeds will be sufficient to cover all future
expenses.
As to the "offset" issue, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court's determination that an "offset" could appropriately be made
against the Robaks' full reimbursement for pecuniary losses. The dis-
trict court had summarily adopted the "defects added-on" approach of
Jacobs and Dumer, cases which had limited recovery to only those ad-
ditional expenses incurred from raising and maintaining the defect of
the child.215 Accordingly, the costs of maintenance, education, medical
care and other similar support costs for raising a normal child would be
subtracted from the total expected costs of rearing the defective
child.216
The Seventh Circuit recognized that the "defects added-on" ap-
proach adopted by the district court assumes that a choice can be made
between having a normal child and a defective one. In reality, this
choice was not available to the Robaks and, therefore, arguably an ir-
relevant standard: 217 the Robaks' only choice would have been a de-
formed child or no child at all. The Seventh Circuit thus reversed the
district court's deduction from the Robaks' award of the cost of raising
a normal child. The court noted that a wrongful birth claim premised
on a doctor's negligently causing the injuries to a child would permit an
"offset" but added that no liability could have ensued in the Robaks'
case since the injuries to the fetus actually occurred prior to any negli-
214. Using a reversionary trust in this matter gives the appearance of an award to the child-
an award held in trust for the protection of her interest. The expressed concern of Judge Aspen
and the nature of the award suggest a predisposition to make an award for wrongful life. It would
be easy to go one step further and recognize wrongful life claims-legitimate claims on the part of
the child, but the district court was limited by the Alabama decision of Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d
546 (Ala. 1978). However, a California court recently ruled that a child could recover if a jury
found the hospital negligently failed to inform his parents of a prenatal test which would have
alerted the parents to the deformed fetus in time to choose an abortion. The case was subse-
quently settled out of court for $900,000. A prior California court had been the first to permit.a
wrongful life claim awarding $1.6 million. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal.
App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). A Texas court recently upheld a wrongful life claim
awarding the child $625,000. Scales v. United States, A-79-CA-70 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
215. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d at 850; Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 780-
81, 233 N.W.2d at 377, 380. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
216. 658 F.2d at 479. See notes 172 and 195 supra and accompanying text.
217. See note 149 supra.
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gence of the doctor 2'18-when Mrs. Robak contracted rubella. Rather,
the Robaks' action was based on the failure to diagnose rubella and
inform Mrs. Robak of its consequences so that she could choose the
option of an abortion. Hence, all expenses resulting from Jennifer's
birth, including the costs of raising a normal child, were the proximate
result of the doctor's negligence. 21 9
By denying the "offset" the Seventh Circuit followed the tradi-
tional notion of compensatory damages-that an injured party should
be placed in the position he would have been in had the wrong not
occurred. 220 With the knowledge that the fetus would be deformed, the
Robaks would have aborted and not incurred any expenses of child
rearing.
IMPACT: UNRESOLVED ISSUES
The Robak decisions provided equitable relief for the parties: the
parents were compensated for the expenses they have and would incur
throughout the life of Jennifer as the result of being denied their right
to choose whether to abort, while the defendant was assured that the
Robaks would not be overcompensated should Jennifer die earlier than
predicted. The reversionary trust allayed fears that courts would other-
wise maintain when ordering large damage awards. However, since
both parties in Robak accepted the reversionary trust as a vehicle for
implementing the damage award,22' it is unclear whether a court can
impose the reversionary trust on unwilling parties through its power to
set damages.222 Furthermore, since the Seventh Circuit did not review
the legality or the appropriateness of the reversionary trust, the prece-
dential value of the reversionary trust is uncertain. Consequently,
should the reversionary trust be discarded, there is no indication
whether the Seventh Circuit would again choose the normal life expec-
tancy as the appropriate "loss period." An answer may be forthcoming
in the determination of a damage award in Phillps v. United States223
or next year when the wrongful birth claim in Speck v. Finegold2 24 will
go to trial in Pennsylvania state court.
Several other issues remain to be settled in adjudicating the rights
218. 658 F.2d at 477. See note 151 supra.
219. 658 F.2d at 477.
220. Id. at 479. MCCoRMICK, sUpra note 113, at § 137.
221. See text accompanying notes 98-112 and 135-47 supra.
222. 503 F. Supp. at 983.
223. 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981).
224. 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. 1979), aj7'd in part 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
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of parents denied their right to choose an abortion. For example,
courts still must determine whether parenthood is a "benefit" which,
according to the "special benefits rule," should be subtracted from the
damage recovery.225 The district court in Jlobak focused solely on eco-
nomic "offsets," such as the cost of rearing a normal child.226 Two
recent cases, however, have confronted this issue, suggesting two possi-
ble approaches.
In Cockrum v. Baumgartner227 an Illinois appellate court refused
to permit the "offset" characterizing the "rewards of parenthood" as
strictly emotional in nature. 228 According to the "special benefits rule,"
a "benefit" may only mitigate damages suffered from the same inter-
est.229 In Cockrum, since the damages compensated plaintiff's eco-
nomic interest, plaintiff's emotional "benefit" of parenthood did not act
as an "offset" to the damage award.230 However, two concurring opin-
ions stated that regardless of the label placed on the "benefit," the trier
of fact should be permitted, on a case-by-case basis, to consider the
actual "benefits" of parenthood. 231 In another Illinois appellate case,
Pierce v. DeGarcia,232 the appellate court, following the concurrences
in Cockrum, held that the jury should be permitted to consider any
"potential benefits" an unplanned child gives to his parents, as one fac-
tor in calculating damages, 233 regardless of whether the benefit is char-
acterized as emotional or economic.
Whether parenting provides any "benefit" to a person is purely a
personal decision, whether the child is normal or deformed. Courts, in
other contexts, have recognized that parenthood can not be considered
a "benefit" as a matter of law.234 They should also recognize the ineq-
uity of imposing their assessment of the 'benefits" of parenthood, on
any set of parents.
225. 503 F. Supp. at 983.
226. 503 F. Supp. at 983 n.2.
227. 99 111. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981). In Cockrum a healthy child was born after a
negligently performed sterilization and the parents sued for the expenses of raising and educating
the child. Id. at 272, 425 N.E.2d at 969.
228. Id. at 274, 425 N.E.2d at 970. See note 144 supra.
229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977). See note 136 supra for the pertinent
language of that section.
230. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 274, 425 N.E.2d at 970.
231.. See Id. at 275-77, 425 N.E.2d at 971-73 (Linn, J. and Romiti, J., concurring).
232. No. 81-360 (Third Illinois Appellate Division).
233. Id.
234. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977). Both courts specifically note that if parenthood were such a "bene-
fit" family planning through contraception would not be so widespread. 187 N.W.2d at 513; 260
N.W.2d at 175.
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An argument is often made in wrongful conception cases, where
the child is normal, that in addition to the emotional benefit of
parenthood, the child provides some economic benefit to the parents
either in income after majority or in support to the parents in their old
age. Under this theory, an "offset" would be proper against the dam-
age award even if only pecuniary losses are compensated. However, in
the wrongful birth context, where the child is abnormal, this theory is
untenable because the child, unable of self-support, will probably not
be able to provide economic benefits for his or her parents. The Robak
district court's silence on whether the "benefits" of parenthood are
characterized as emotional or pecuniary, and whether the "special ben-
efits rule" should be applied may indicate that either the court failed to
even consider this aspect of "offsets" or that these questions are more
relevant to the wrongful conception context.235
Another major unresolved issue concerns whether emotional dis-
tress damages are compensable in a wrongful birth action. Emotional
distress damages were not sought in the Robaks' complaint so the court
did not have the opportunity to address the issue.236 However, a re-
quest for emotional distress damages should be an integral part of the
wrongful birth claim. An emotional distress injury may be considered
either as a one-time injury resulting from the realization of the child's
condition at birth,237 or a continuing injury resulting from the distress
in raising the child and dealing on a daily basis with the deformity.238
Where the injury is characterized as a one-time injury, a lump-sum
award would be the appropriate remedy; but if the injury is ongoing,
the reversionary trust would provide the same protection against
overcompensating the parents as it did with respect to pecuniary
losses.239
The trend seems to be moving toward permitting recovery for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress.240 Courts are recognizing that
emotional trauma is very real and that malingerers can be distin-
guished from those with genuine claims.241 The reversionary trust con-
235. Wrongful conception is the cause of action resulting from a negligent sterilization. In
almost all such cases the child born is a normal, healthy one. See note 2 supra.
236. The author spoke with Barbara Klein of Karlin & Fleischer, Chicago, Illinois in October,
1981. Ms. Klein, one of the attorneys for the Robaks stated that since there was not enough case
support favoring an emotional damages award, none was included in the complaint.
237. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
238. Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64 (1977); Karlsons v.
Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977).
239. See notes 176-79 supra and accompanying text.
240. See notes 81-97 supra and accompanying text.
241. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968); Rickey v. Chicago
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cept may influence courts to move toward permitting recovery for
emotional distress in wrongful birth actions as either parasitic damages
of the negligence, or as a "bystander," since the trust would insure no
over compensation where the "loss period" could not be calculated
with certainty.
CONCLUSION
Once establishing liability for wrongful birth, the Robak case
made a significant contribution to the resolution of damage calculation
by suggesting both an equitable approach to calculating damages and a
vehicle for implementing the damage award. The "loss period" has an
important impact on the total recovery and whether losses are, in fact,
adequately compensated. In cases where the child can never be self-
supporting, the Robak decisions hold that the "loss period" must ex-
tend to the full life expectancy shown on actuarial tables for healthy
children. However, the court chose this "loss period" only after it
promulgated the reversionary trust. The reversionary trust allayed the
courts' fears that, while assuring reimbursement for all of the parents'
losses, an error in judgment regarding the proper "loss period" would
not shower a windfall on the parents if the child died before the end of
that "loss period." Future courts experiencing a similar hesitancy can
similarly protect against inequities while at the same time guaranteeing
a just settlement for the injured party by utilizing a reversionary trust.
The reversionary trust played no role, however, in the district
court's decision regarding appropriate "offsets," because the court read-
ily adopted the "defects added-on" approach of the Jacobs' court.
Holding that no "offset" was appropriate for the costs of raising a nor-
mal child since all expenses were proximately caused by the physician's
negligence, the Seventh Circuit returned to the traditional notion of
remedy-4o place the injured party where he would have been had the
wrong not occurred. The silence of the Robak courts on the "special
benefits rule," coupled with its denial of the "offset" for childrearing
may indicate that in the wrongful birth context no "offset" is proper.
The formula for damages designed by the Robak decisions pro-
vides a meaningful approach to damage calculation for wrongful birth
claims. We need await future decisions to know if the reversionary
Transit Authority, 101 Ill. App. 3d 439, 428 N.E.2d 596 (1981); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa.
401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979). See generally Mental Distress,
supra note 87; Amdursky, The Interest in Mental Tranquility Damages In Personal InJury and
Wronful Death Cases, PRAc. L. INST. 297 (ed. Schreiber 1965).
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trust will receive judicial acceptance as the vehicle for equitably com-
pensating the wrongful birth injury. Future courts should adopt the
Robak approach and focus their attention toward resolving the unan-
swered questions.
CARYL WOLFSON LEIGHTMAN
Note: After the text of this comment was already written, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court in Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982)
modified a judgment in a case holding that a wrongful birth damage
action existed regarding Tay Sachs disease. The court reduced the ver-
dict by $2274.26, refusing to allow for funeral expenses and the cost of
the grave marker. The court did, however, permit recovery for the "ex-
penses incurred in the care and treatment of their afflicted child" and
emotional distress damages. Id. at 830-31.
The court distinguished the decision in Berman stating that a de-
nial of pecuniary reimbursement in the Naccash case was not required
because the "enormity of the financial burden. . imposed upon the
negligent physician, is not present here. . . . Carrier Burger's life span
was measured in months, and the cost of her care and treatment was
relatively inexpensive." Id. at 830. This was so because Tay Sachs
children usually die before they are five years old. The court indicated,
however, that "the court should not perform a balancing test between
competing economic interests in determining whether an injured party
is entitled to a particular category of damages." Id See notes 77-80
supra and accompanying text. On the other hand, the court was com-
pelled to follow the Berman court's determination that emotional dis-
tress damages were compensable to avoid a perversion of justice. Id. at
831. In Naccash the court determined that the emotional distress was a
direct result of the negligence of the doctor instead of the result of be-
ing a bystander. Id See notes 98-112 supra and accompanying text.
